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ABSTRACT
Informed Institutional Shareholding: Evidence from Political Promotion
by
ZHANG Chi
Master of Philosophy

Are institutional investors informed to the political promotion events? This paper
examines the informed trading of institutional investors in the context of political
promotion. Institutional investors have superior information environment compared to
retail investors. It can establish private information channel with firm management,
financial analysts, regulatory bodies and other types of institutions. Since
contemporary economic activities are more or less influenced by politics, promotion
of important officials can bring favorable local economic development opportunities
to companies. If institutional investors are informed to the political promotion events,
they are supposed to react in advance of the occurrence of promotion events. We test
this proposition in the setting of China where political power is believed to be strong.
In our research, we treat the promotion of Chinese provincial politicians as a private
signal to institutional investors to examine their trading pattern. Through a differencein-difference approach, we find that institutional investors accelerate their purchase of
shares of the firms exposed to the promotion events before the promotion activities
actually happens and increase their shareholding in listed firms after the promotion
events. The institutional investors earn a higher cumulative stock return by adjusting
their portfolio to the promotion events. We also find this difference in institutional
shareholding primarily occurs to firms with low state-own share percentage.
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Informed Institutional Shareholding: Evidence from Political Promotion

Chapter 1 Introduction

Are institutional investors informed? This question has invited intensive debate in the
public and the academia for a long time. A series of literature have documented
institutions’ informed trading. Badrinath et al. (1995) show that returns of stocks are
positively related to institutional ownership. Institutional trading can be used to predict
stock returns at the firm, industry and market levels (Boulatov et al. (2013)).
Hendershott et al. (2015) use daily institutional buy and sell data and find that
institutional trading predicts news announcements, sentiment of news, returns on
announcement day and earnings announcement surprises. In contrast, other studies
provide evidence that institutions are not informed. The finding of Griffin et al. (2012)
is institutions are reluctant to use inside information from investment bank clients.
Busse et al. (2012) show that institutional investors are unable to evaluate the accuracy
of financial analyst's recommendations in a way better than other investors. One
possible explanation of the conflicting empirical evidence is most prior literature did
not distinguish the specific context that institutional investors take advantage of when
they are forming trading strategies. A very few papers, e.g. Li (2011), have shown
evidence that institutional investors use non-public information to trade before M&A
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announcements. However, we are still far from a complete picture on whether
institutional investors are informed in trading; if they are, what types of information
they use and through what channels they acquire information.
In this paper, we examine the question in the context of political promotion.
Specifically, we study whether institutional investors trade on private information
about political promotion events before it is publicly known to the market. In this paper,
political promotion refers to the process that a local government leader gets a position
in the central government. It is a notable event containing news that can be used by
institutional investors to benefit their trading. The appointment announcements of
these officials will be captured by the public and they are important events for local
society. It usually stands for change of regulations and policies which can affect
company’s operation. It can also be a signal of the past conducts or achievements of
the politician in the local region. In either case, if institutional investors have access to
such information prior to the public, they are expected to adjust their shareholding and
benefit from informed trading.
Political turnovers take place every several years for a region, yet not always for
promotions. Even though the promotion of a bureaucrat might be partly attributed to
his economic achievements, it is mainly based on political consideration. Shih et al.
(2012) argues that personal background such as education level, working experience
2

and social ties to national leaders play a more important role in promotion decisions
than regional economic development. General public including mutual funds
managers does not have the ability to influence the central government's determination
of official appointments. Therefore, political promotion events are plausibly
exogenous to the market before their public announcements and can be a possible area
that institutional investors may acquire private information about and exploit prior to
the official announcements.
There are several competing hypotheses on the relationship between political
promotion and institutional investors' shareholding. First, we consider whether
institutions conduct informed trading before a promotion happens. Institutions usually
hire experts who are professional at investments to manage their funds so it is
reasonable for them to obtain a higher return than retail investors frequently.
Nonetheless, they also have superior information environment. Their employees may
have working experience in regulatory bodies or listed firms and they can directly
communicate with management of invested firms and financial analysts. The abundant
information channels enable institutions to make predictions more precisely to support
the success of informed trading. A news report from Sina finance in 2014 stated that
at least 40 mutual fund senior management team members are former officials in the
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China Securities Regulatory Commission based on public available data. 1 Once
institutions are informed, they will adjust their portfolios ahead of events occurrence.
If institutions do not have such private information, we should expect no difference
between institutional investors' shareholding of firms exposed to political promotion
and those of firms do not experience promotion before the event really occurs.
If institutions are informed of a promotion event, the next question is what is
institutions' expectation on the reaction of firms to political promotion. Two sets of
theories can be used to predict firms' behavior when political promotion takes place.
One is the political uncertainty theory and the other one is the political influence theory.
The political uncertainty theory argues that companies worry about the possible bad
results of political events and would like to avoid the loss associated with them. Julio
and Yook (2012) study the effects of national elections on corporate investment in 48
countries from 1980 to 2005. Their results show that uncertainty induced by elections
lead to temporary reduction of corporate investment expenditure until the uncertainty
dismisses. Gulen and Ion (2016) find similar results at the aggregate level of
uncertainty. They empirically support the argument that policy uncertainty causes
companies to be so mindful about the possible potential loss of investment that they
prefer to postpone their projects to avoid waste of funds, which suppresses corporate

1

http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/fund/20140519/104219151671.shtml
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investment. In this case, firms under the influence of political promotion events should
slow down their development before the promotion. This is negative news to the stock
market. In view of this, informed institutional investors will hold less shares of firms
experiencing promotion events before the events.
The political influence theory means government will directly affect companies by
regulations and policies. Some literature studies the political influence on firm
behavior. In 1996, Qian points out the drawback of the practice that Chinese stateowned enterprises (SOEs) only delegate part of the control rights to professional
managers and the government remains the ultimate controll. The agency costs are high
because managers do not own the firms and do not need to be responsible for decisions
made for the firms. Meanwhile the political costs are also high as the government has
to intervene to mitigate the agency problem. He suggests further ownership reform for
SOEs. Fan et al. (2013) provide empirical results showing the result of SOE ownership
reform is the balance of agency costs and political costs. Chen and Yuan (2004) finds
out that listed firms were enthusiastic to conduct earnings management from 1996 to
1998 as they were required to achieve a minimum return on equity (ROE) of 10%. If
the political influence theory is dominant, it is expected bureaucrats support the
development of enterprises within his jurisdiction in order to increase the chance of
promotion before the event. On this occasion, the institutional investors are supposed
5

to increase their shareholding of firms exposed to promotion before the events.
To test our hypotheses, we manually collect data on the promotion events of provincial
leaders from 31 provinces in China and merge the data with the percentage of nonfinancial listed A-share firms shares held by institutions from 2003 to 2014. China is
a country where politics matters a lot in business. If politics does affect institutional
investors, we should be able to find results. The provincial level of promotion is an
appropriate setting. Since firms in our sample are all listed firms which are the largest
group of corporations in the country, the provincial leader is powerful enough to issue
policies to influence these firms within his province. On the other hand, a provincial
leader is the highest official for a local government. The only promotion target for
them is the central government once they get promoted. Hence, it is easy to distinguish
promotion from other kinds of turnover based on the title of positions after events. The
reason why we start from 2003 is that the Chinese Securities Investment Fund Law is
stipulated in that year. The mutual fund industry is not regulated before 2003 and we
are unable to get credible data.
The results show that institutional investors adjust their trading strategies in view of
the promotion of the provincial leaders. They increase their purchase of shares of
companies located in the provinces where a promotion is going to take place one year
later. The average change of shares held by mutual funds for firms experiencing
6

promotion is 0.9% greater than that of firms not exposed to promotion. Given that the
mean of mutual funds shareholding is around 10%, on average mutual funds purchase
relatively 9% more shares of companies experiencing promotion than companies not
experiencing promotion. The institutional shareholding levels of these firms are higher
than that of other firms in the first two years after the promotion event takes place. In
the year when promotion occurs, mutual funds on average hold 0.9% more shares from
firms experiencing promotion events compared with other firms. In the year after the
event year, the average drops to 0.7% which means mutual funds realize part of the
profits from political promotion. Our analysis of the stock return shows that the
portfolio of stocks of firms in the promotion provinces have

5% -7% greater

cumulative abnormal return compared to the rest. Institutional investors are experts in
investment who are good at taking advantage of information. Given that some
managers in these institutions are former government officials and former listed firm
employees, institutional investors have much broader information channel than others.
They are able to know the promotion favorable to firms. The empirical results imply
that mutual funds is able to know the information of future political promotion prior
to the event's occurrence and increase their profits accordingly.
This paper contributes to the literature in the following aspects. Even though there is
a large quantity of research examining the function of institutional investors on firms’
7

performance and organization, few studies have considered what factors can influence
the investment portfolio decisions of institutional investors. The current situation is
that the public understands the significance of institutional investors but has little idea
the behavior pattern of institutional investors based on information available. This
paper is complementary to this line of research. It also draws attention to future
research in this area as much is still remained unknown to us.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to document that political events can
affect investors’ portfolios. Previous studies mainly focus on the macro economic
effects of political events or the corporate level reaction to those events. This paper
pushes down the research to a more concrete organizational investor level.
This study uses China as setting to test the impact of politics on institutional investors.
It can provide some inspiration on the potential research on other sort of influence
induced by political power in emerging market. Since emerging economy is often
associated with weak institutions, the power of politics is usually stronger in economic
development. It is an inevitable force in those markets which should be further
explored.
Our research can also provide policy implications for regulatory bodies. The purpose
of institutional investors is not only for them to receive trading profits but also to
increase the stability of stock market as a result of the monitoring function of
8

institutional investors. The regulatory body might consider new rules to restrain the
implicit connection between institutional investors and itself in order to increase their
exposure to the scrutiny of regulatory bodies.
The rest of the paper is organized as the follows. Chapter 2 introduces the institutional
background of key concepts. Chapter 3 gives literature review on political promotion
research and institutional investor studies in China. Chapter 4 develops our hypotheses
about the effects of political promotion on mutual funds’ trading. Chapter 5 illustrates
the data source, sample selection process, the research design to test the hypotheses
and descriptive statistics. Chapter 6 is the empirical results of our studies. Eventually,
we conclude and reflect on our studies in Chapter 7.

Chapter 2 Institutional Background

2.1 Introduction of political promotion

Politics plays an important role in modern economic activities. Governments are policy
makers and regulators guiding the economy. Economy develops under the influence
of political power. Jones and Olken (2005) document that national leaders matter for
the countries’ economic growth. They appear to affect the outcomes of countries’
policies especially monetary policies. The effects become stronger in nations where
the leader’s personal power is less limited. Like the national leaders, other levels of
9

bureaucrats also exert their influence over economy. One sort of typical political events
is the promotion of local government officials. In this paper, we define the concept of
political promotion as the process that a local government official obtain a position in
the central government which is usually a position with more power compared to the
old one. Since local economy is more directly influenced by local force compared to
the central power, local governors are responsible to support local economic
development which may increase their chance of promotion. In China, this
phenomenon is prevalent for each level of government officials. China is a country
where the political power is believed to be strong. It used to employ planned economy
system and decided to transit to market economy system. However, the government
remains great power to influence the economy during the transition stage. Li (1998)
notes that at the start of the transformation of system, the central government mandated
that all levels of bureaucrats were supposed to know about capitalist ideas and allowed
to quit government to join businesses. In this situation, their incentives to push
economic development are increased. The duties of provincial leaders include
supporting the economic system transformation, attracting investment from entities
outside the province, boosting the prosperity of private enterprises, improving
infrastructure conditions and cooperating with other regions. The emphasis of
bureaucratic evaluation standard has shifted from political outcomes to economic
10

accomplishments. One essential indicator for the likelihood of government officials’
promotion to higher level of government is their economic achievements during their
tenure as provincial governors or secretaries of the party. If the official can demonstrate
that he has the ability to advance economic construction, the chance of his promotion
will rise. On the other hand, the number limit of positions in the central government
creates a “competitive job market” for local bureaucrats. Facing the limited supply of
job posts in the central government, local government officials who demand for higher
positions must compete with each other. Under this circumstance, provincial leaders
have the incentives to acquire better economic outcomes to increase the likelihood of
promotion.

2.2 Introduction of institutional investors

Institutional investors are organizations that trade securities in large enough share
quantities compared to individual investors. They are usually managed by
knowledgeable people who are supposed to have better investment strategies. They are
important components of minority shareholders. Even though they do not hold share
for control purpose, their large quantity of shareholding enable them to negotiate with
firms to influence their business. Starting form Hirschman (1970), institutional
investors usually have two choices to deal with invested firms. One is engagement
with management to make changes (“voice”) and the other one is threat to sell shares
11

of the firm (“exit”). Aggarwal et al. (2011) analyze institutional portfolio holdings in
companies from 23 countries and provide empirical results for the corporate
governance role played by institutional investors. The growth of institutional
ownership over time can contribute to the subsequent enhancement of firm-level
corporate governance mechanisms and outcomes. The significance corporate
government function is further confirmed by McCahery et al. (2016). They use survey
data directly collected from managers working for institutional investors and get the
conclusion that institutional investors indeed use “voice” and “exit” methods to
motivate the firms to improve their corporate governance.

2.3 Introduction of mutual funds industry in China

In China, the majority of institutional investors is mutual funds. Chinese mutual fund
industry has a relatively short history. Currently, there are 121 mutual fund companies
in China with total assets of 9,181 billion CNY. The first mutual fund in China was set
in 2001 and the mutual fund industry was formally established in 2003 by the
stipulation of Securities Investment Fund Law. Before that, mutual funds could not be
distinguished from other kinds of investment funds since funds were allowed to invest
in any products not necessarily securities. This caused the severe heterogeneity in
funds in respect of return rate, risk, size, etc. In view of the chaos in fund industry, the
Securities Investment Fund Law also clear states mutual funds should operate under
12

the scrutiny of China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).
A feature of Chinese mutual funds is they prefer to employ former government officials,
especially those who have worked in the CSRC. Because the law does not clearly
restrict members of CSRC to work in mutual fund companies after they leave, some
CSRC officials are willing to work in mutual funds firms for better personal wealth.
These people are familiar with the working of CSRC so they can help mutual funds to
better cope with the regulation of CSRC. They also know current officials in CSRC
who can provide privileges to “acquaintances” in mutual funds. In this way, mutual
funds creates informal connection to CSRC to gain benefits.

2.4 Introduction of China’s government official promotions

There are 4 levels of local government which are provincial level, prefecture level,
county level and township level. Even though the administrative rank of an official is
not simply equivalent to the level of government where he works, a politician of a
higher level of government usually has higher rank than people from a lower level of
government. Each level of government is ultimately led by a secretary of the party as
China requires the CPC to guide everything. Nowadays, China has established a “civil
service” system to organize government officials. Normally if a person would like to
work in the government, he/she must pass national examination for admissions to the
civil service and be selected by a department of the basic level government (usually
13

the county level government as the township level government is formed by local
residents). Well-performed civil servants (i.e. officials) will get chance to be granted
higher ranks and promoted to higher positions. When he takes office of the secretary
of the party of that level of government, the higher level of government is responsible
to decide whether to promote the person to this level of government. The promotion
takes place step by step, that is, no skip to the next rank is allowed. The selection
criteria are never disclosed to the public. Nonetheless, ages, education background,
working experience and achievements during the tenure are all factors considered for
promotions. Once a politician has become the secretary of party for the provincial level
government, the central government can decide whether give him a position in the
central government, which is actually a promotion from the local government to the
central government.

Chapter 3. Literature Review

3.1 Political turnover and promotion in China

Since China is a country where political power plays an important role for several
decades, the economic and financial effects associated with political events has been
widely studies in China. A set of literature focus on the economic impact of
bureaucrat’s turnover and promotion. Li and Zhou (2005) documents that the Chinese
14

governments sets bureaucrat promotion requirements to guide local leaders to obtain
desirable economic outcomes. The likelihood of promotion of provincial leaders
increases with their economic performance, while the likelihood of termination
decreases with their economic performance. The turnover of provincial leaders is more
sensitive to their average performance over their tenure than to their annual
performance. Chen et al. (2005) argues that relative performance evaluation scheme is
actually used in the turnover decisions made by the central government. When
considering the turnover of provincial leaders, the central government compare the
provincial economic performance of the leader with that of his immediate predecessor.
Shih et al. (2012) provides an opposite story. Even though it is reasonable that
motivated local administrators compete with one another to generate high growth, they
fail to find evidence that strong growth performance was rewarded with higher party
ranks at any of the post reform party congresses. Instead, other political and personal
reasons are more relevant to officials’ promotion. They conclude that promotion is
more a representative of leaders’ will than a payoff of economic development
achievements. Piotroski et al. (2015) argue that politicians and their affiliated firms
(i.e. firms operating in their province) temporarily suppress negative information
before the meetings of the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and
promotions of high-level provincial politicians. This results fewer stock price crashes
15

for the affiliated firms during these event windows, followed by an increase in crashes
after the event. Consistent with these predictions, they find that the affiliated firms
experience a reduction (an increase) in negative stock return skewness before (after)
the event.

3.2 Institutional investors in China

Current institutional investor research focus on the function of institutional investors
to firms and markets. Yuan et al. (2008) find that equity ownership by mutual funds
has a positive effect on firm performance. Their results support efforts to promote
mutual funds as a corporate governance mechanism and suggest that pooling diffuse
minority interests of individual shareholders who are prone to free-rider problems via
mutual funds is beneficial. Yao and Liu (2009) find that China’s institutional investors
play an active role in controlling insider expropriation through equity financing. Firth
et al. (2010) find that state ownership has a positive effect on the final compensation
ratio. In contrast, mutual fund ownership has a negative effect on the compensation
ratio and especially in state-owned firms. The evidence is consistent with the
explanation that state shareholders have incentives to complete the reform quickly and
exert political pressure on mutual funds to accept the terms without a fight.
Wu et al. (2016) observe that firms that have a large proportion of their shares held by
institutional investors are less likely to receive enforcement actions against corporate
16

fraud. Institutional ownership plays a more important role in declining regulatory
enforcement incidents against state-owned enterprises. Firth et al. (2016) find that
mutual funds influence firms to pay higher cash dividends. The effects are more
pronounced in firms controlled by state and regional governments and in firms with
relatively higher free cash flows. They also provide evidence that the mutual funds’
effects are stronger when their investment horizon is longer and the ownership interest
is larger. Other institutional investors, such as banks, insurance companies, and
securities companies have a lower exit threat and do not have an influence on firms’
cash dividend payments or financial performances.

Chapter 4 Hypothesis Development

Institutional investors usually possess superior information gathering and processing
capabilities. Boehmer and Kelley (2009) points out that institutions can react to news
within 30 minutes after its release. Their trading enhances the market price efficiency
as other investors follow their transactions which are timely reactions to new available
information. In China, institutions recruit part of its employees from regulatory body,
listed firms and other types of institutions. In this way, they establish informal
information channels through social ties of their staff. In an emerging market like
China where institutions and governance is weak, private information channels and
17

personal relationship are favorable to improve the information environment to gain
benefits in business. It is possible for mutual funds to receive private information
regarding future promotion of officials. They have the ability to adjust their investment
portfolios ahead of the occurrence of promotion events. Hence, they are capable of
informed trading ahead of promotion events.
From the perspective of companies, they can acquire information from established
links with incumbent leaders. Firms can know the future change of local governors in
advance. However, it is possible they are unable to foresee the identity of the incoming
provincial leader. The leave of the incumbent and the induction of the successor may
not be decided simultaneously. The successor can be either promoted from the same
province or transferred from other provinces. An unknown future local leader means
uncertainty about the policies in the future. Hence, firms are likely to hold investments
to avoid potential loss associated with uncertainty.
As Piotroski and Zhang (2014) mention, political promotions are intensively correlated
with local economic development. Local provincial leaders can accumulate personal
wealth through support initial public offerings (IPOs). They will be rewarded for
capital market development. Prior research also documents officials are likely to
receive promotion after they have accomplished remarkable economic achievements.
These bureaucrats have incentives to support firm development. Firms can benefit
18

from favorable policies, better investment environment and improved information
environment. These conditions provide firms with opportunities to increase
investments for greater growth. It is also reasonable for firms to boost their
development under such circumstance.
Based on the competing theories, we have the following hypotheses with no predicted
directions.
H1: Other things being equal, the promotion events of local leaders affects the level of
mutual funds’ shareholding percentage of firms.
H2: Other things being equal, the promotion events of local leaders affects the change
of mutual funds’ shareholding percentage of firms.

Chapter 5 Data, Sample and Research Design

5.1 Data and sample construction

In this research, our data sources are Wind Information (Wind), China Stock Market
and Accounting Research (CSMAR) and China’s government websites. Wind provides
the percentage of shares held by institutional investors and stock return and firm
financial data are from CSMAR. We hand collect the promotion information of
provincial leaders of 31 provinces in China from their resumes and announcement of
taking office posted on "the People's website" (http://www.people.com.cn/). This
19

website belongs to the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China and one
of its function is to publicize the change of positions of senior government officials
decided by the central government. To increase the transparency of these appointments,
the education background and working experience of the officials will be disclosed at
the same time. Figure 1 shows the frequency of promotion events for each year. The
frequencies for 2007 and 2012 are higher than other years as they are the start year of
a new group of central government officials.
To better distinguish influence of political promotion from time trend, we use a
difference-in-difference (DID) approach. Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrates the process
of our DID sample construction. For every year of the period 2005-2014, we divide
provinces into treatment groups and control groups. If a promotion event occurs in a
province, this province is classified as one element of the treatment group for that
specific year. The remaining provinces without promotion events are the control group
for that year. Given that promotion occur for multiple times, we construct episodes to
build our testing sample. Figure 2 shows how we define an episode of our sample. An
episode is a 5-year period of which the event year is in the middle. In other words, we
attach two years before the event and two years after the event to each treatment group
and control group. In an episode, a province is regarded as an element of the treatment
group for the whole 5-year period as long as it is classified into treatment group in the
20

event year (t=0), regardless of its original classifications in other years.2 Similarly, if
a province is classified into the control group in the event year, it is in the control group
for the whole period. Based on the province episode, we pick up firm-year
observations affiliated to the provinces in the two groups to form the firm-year episode.
Figure 3 shows how to select years to combine episodes into the final sample. We build
episodes on a rolling basis. In this way, each episode alone is a small subsample for
the DID test. The ultimate sample we use to analyze is the combination of ten episodes.

5.2 Research design

We use the following models to conduct both level and change analyses:
MF_HOLD ∆MF_HOLD
γCONTROL

∗

ε

(1)

MF_HOLD ∆MF_HOLD
1

∝

∗

2

∝
2

∗

1

1

0
∗

0

2

Here we do not restrict the episode to be an entirely clean one given the following concerns. First, the

likelihood of promotion is different for developed and developing provinces. Sometimes the central
government reappoints a provincial leader to a more developed province before he is formally promoted
to the position in the central government. If we require a totally clean sample, the observations are
dramatically reduced and they are mainly from less developed provinces, which gives biased results.
Second, for a single province, promotion seldom occurs for consecutive years.
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∗

1

γCONTROL

ε

(2)

Model 1 is the typical DID regression. MF_HOLD is the percentage of a firm's shares
owned by mutual funds, calculated as the number of shares owned by mutual funds
divided by the total number of shares in issue. TREAT is a dummy variable equals 1 if
a firm is located in a province where the provincial governor or the secretary of the
provincial committee is promoted to the central government in the event year, and 0
otherwise. PRE is a dummy variable equals 1 if this year is one or two years before a
provincial governor or secretary of the provincial committee is promoted to the central
government, and 0 otherwise. PRE*TREAT is the interaction term to capture the diffin-diff effects. CONTROL stands for the following group of control variables. MB is
the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets at the year end. Market
value of assets is defined as the market value of equity plus book value of debts. LEV
is the leverage ratio calculated as total liabilities over total assets at the year end. Size
is the natural logarithm of a firm's total assets at the year end. ROA is the return on
assets calculated as net profits divided by total assets. CR is the current ratio, computed
as current assets divided by current liabilities at the end of the year. AR is the accounts
receivable intensity, computed as the ending balances of accounts receivable divided
by total assets at the end of the year. INV is Inventory intensity, computed as the ending
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balances of inventories divided by total assets at the end of the year. GDP is the gross
domestic product of the province where the firm locates. STATESHARE is the
percentage of a firm's shares owned by the central or local government, calculated as
the number of shares owned by the government divided by the total number of shares
in issue.
Model 2 is the dynamics of DID regression. We replace the original single time
indicators with 4 year indicators representing different stages in the DID sample. PRE2
is 2 years before the event year. PRE1 refers to the year before the event year. POST0
stands for the event year and POST1 means one year after the promotion year.
ΔMF_HOLD is the annual change of percentage of shares held by mutual funds, i.e.
the difference between the percentage of shares held by mutual funds of the current
year and that of last year. The control variables for the change analysis are replaced
with their respective change format similar to the change in mutual fund shareholding.

5.3 Descriptive statistics

Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics. Panel A of Table 1 shows summary statistics
for the whole sample composed of 10 episodes. The average percentage of share held
by mutual funds is 9.84% while the median is 3.46%. The mean of annual change of
percentage of mutual funds shareholding is -0.48% and the median of that is -0.04%.
Panel B of Table 1 demonstrates the univariate tests of the difference between the
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treatment group and the control group before and after the event. Before the promotion
event occurs, the percentage of shares held by mutual funds for firms in treatment
groups is less than that for companies in the control group, though not statistically
significant. This implies that before the promotion occurs, mutual funds are likely to
hold less percentage of shares of firms in the treatment group than firms in the control
groups. This difference reduces after the occurrence of political promotion events,
which shows during the event mutual funds increase their percentage of shares held
for treated companies compared to the control group.

Chapter 6 Empirical Results

6.1 Annual change of mutual fund shareholding

Table 2 shows the regression results of impact of political promotion on annual change
of mutual fund shareholding percentage. Column 1 and 2 of Table 2 are the results of
the typical DID model (model (1)). PRE is statistically significantly negatively
associated withΔMF_HOLD. For the control group, the general trend of mutual fund
shareholding level is decline before the event occurs. Nonetheless, given that
TREAT*PRE is statistically significantly positively related toΔMF_HOLD and its
magnitude is apparently large than PRE, we can find that the percentage of shares held
by mutual funds is increasing for the period before the promotions. This preliminary
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result shows mutual funds already start to increase their holdings of shares of firms
which are going to experience the promotion events before the provincial leader is
actually promoted to the central government.
Column 3 of Table 2 is the result of the dynamic version DID model (model (2)). This
column provides us with a clearer picture of the annual change of mutual fund
shareholdings. The coefficients for PRE2 and PRE1 are statistically significantly
negative at 10% level and 1% level respectively. In fact, we break down the beforeevent period into two separate years and find the decrease of mutual fund shareholding
for control group firms mainly happens one year before the event occurs. In contrast,
the coefficients of TREAT*PRE2 and TREAT*PRE1 are statistically significantly
positive at 10% level and 1% level respectively. Combining the effects of time term
and interaction term, we find mutual funds explicitly increase their shareholding of
firms belonging to the treatment groups, especially in the year immediately before the
event year. Based on the results of Table 2, mutual funds appear to adjust their
portfolios ahead of the promotion eventually occurs. It seems that mutual funds are
able to foresee the future event of provincial leader’s promotion. However, the
promotion decision is made public when the politician has taken office of the new
position. One possible explanation for the predictability of mutual funds is that they
manage to know the promotion message ahead of the public.
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6.2 Mutual fund shareholding percentage

Table 3 shows the regression results of the promotion effects on the level of percentage
of firm shares held by mutual funds. The coefficients of TREAT*PRE1,
TREAT*POST0 and TREAT*POST1 are statistically significantly positive while the
coefficients of TREAT*PRE2 is not statistically significant. This demonstrates mutual
funds tend to hold more shares of firms that has experienced political promotion events
than shares of firms do not exposed to promotion before the event actually takes place.
Combined the results of Table 2 and Table 3, we can find that compared to shares of
firms located in provinces without promotion, mutual funds act as they know the
incoming events before they really happen. Mutual funds will accelerate the
accumulation of shares of firms in provinces with promotion before the promotion and
retain a higher level of stock holding percentage after the event.

6.3 Cumulative portfolio return

To further strengthen the credibility of our research, we calculate the cumulative stock
return and the cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return. Figure 4 illustrates the
trend of cumulative stock returns for the consecutive 48 months starting from the year
before the event happens. In the first 12 months, the returns for the two groups are
almost the same. The two lines start to divide in after the 13rd month, i.e., in the event
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year. The return of the portfolio of treatment groups is apparently higher than that of
the control group. Table 4 shows the regression results of cumulative stock returns and
cumulative abnormal returns associated with the political promotion events. The
coefficients of TREAT*POST1 and TREAT*POST2 are statistically significant in
both columns and the coefficient of TREAT*POST0 is statistically significant for the
cumulative abnormal return model. Generally, the cumulative returns of the stocks in
the treatment group are higher than those of firms in the control group. Mutual funds
can increase their trading profits by adjusting its trading portfolio according to the
promotion events in different provinces.

6.4 Political connections

To better analyze our research question, we divided the full sample into two
subsamples based on the state-owned share percentage. We use 20% of the share as
the cutoff point which is used by Piotroski et al. (2015). Government holding over 20%
of a firm’s share can exert strong influence on the firm’s operation. If more than 20%
of a firm's outstanding shares are controlled by the government, the company is
classified as a firm with high state-owner share percentage. The remaining
corporations are in the group of low state-owned share percentage firms. Table 5 shows
the regression results of the two groups. The effect of promotion only occurs in the
subsample composed of low state-owned share percentage. Our explanation for this
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phenomenon is mutual funds believe firms with high state-owned share percentages
have enough political connection and they do not necessarily to rely on the
opportunities created by political promotion events while firms with low state-owned
share percentage attach much importance to the promotion events of provincial leaders.

Chapter 7 Conclusion

This paper documents the institutional investors informed trading in the context of
political promotion in China. The results show that institutional investors will
accelerate their purchase of shares of firms that will experience political promotion
events next year before the promotion event occur. Their shareholding of the firm
experiencing promotion events are significantly higher than that of companies not
exposed to political promotions. These evidences indicate institutions receive private
information about the future promotion events ahead of the occurrence of these events
and they also expect their invested firms will take chance to develop, which is a
positive signal for the whole market. We also examine the cumulative return of the
portfolios of the two groups of companies and find that the cumulative stock return
and cumulative abnormal return for the portfolios of corporations exposed to political
promotion events is higher. Institutional investors obtain higher return by adjusting
their portfolios based on those promotion events. In addition, when we divide the firms
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into two subsamples, the difference in change of shareholding percentage only shows
in the group of firms with low state-own share percentage. This may be explained as
firms with low state-own share percentage count more on the favorable environment
created by the political promotion events.
Our paper focuses on the effect of an aspect of concrete factors, politics, on institutions’
informed trading behavior. Future research can explore the impact of other types of
stimulus on informed trading so as to resolve the current contradiction of informed
trading literature.
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Appendix: Variable Definitions
Variable
Definition
Percentage of a firm's shares owned by mutual funds, calculated as the
MF_HOLD
number of shares owned by mutual funds divided by the total number of
shares in issue
A dummy variable equals 1 if a firm is located in a province where provincial
TREAT
governor or secretary of the provincial committee is promoted to the central
government in the event year, and 0 otherwise
A dummy variable equals 1 if this year is one or two years before a provincial
PRE
governor or secretary of the provincial committee is promoted to the central
government, and 0 otherwise
A dummy variable equals 1 if this year is two years before a provincial
PRE2
governor or secretary of the provincial committee is promoted to the central
government, and 0 otherwise
A dummy variable equals 1 if this year is one year before a provincial governor
PRE1
or secretary of the provincial committee is promoted to the central
government, and 0 otherwise
A dummy variable equals 1 if a provincial governor or secretary of the
POST0
provincial committee is promoted to the central government in this year, and 0
otherwise
A dummy variable equals 1 if this year is one year after a provincial governor
POST1
or secretary of the provincial committee is promoted to the central
government, and 0 otherwise
A dummy variable equals 1 if this year is two years after a provincial governor
POST2
or secretary of the provincial committee is promoted to the central
government, and 0 otherwise
RET
Cumulative monthly stock returns
CAR
Cumulative monthly market-adjusted stock returns
The market value of assets divided by the book value of assest at the year end.
MB
Market value of assets is defined as the market value of equity plus book value
of debts
LEV
The leverage ratio calculated as total liabilities over total assets at the year end
Size
Natural logarithm of a firm's total assets at the year end
ROA
Return on assets calculated as net profits divided by total assets
Current ratio,computed as current assets divided by current liabilities at the end
CR
of the year
Accounts receivable intensity, computed as the ending balances of accounts
AR
receivable divided by total assets at the end of the year
Inventory intensity, computed as the ending balances of inventories divided by
INV
total assets at the end of the year
The natural logarithm of gross domestic product of the province where the
GDP
firm locates
Percentage of a firm's shares owned by the central or local government,
STATESHARE calculated as the number of shares owned by the government divided by the
total number of shares in issue
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Figure 1 Annual political promotion frequencies for the year 2003-2014
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Figure 2 Construction of an episode
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Figure 3 Construction of sample with episodes on a rolling basis

33

Figure

4

48-month

cumulative

34

stock

return

Table 1
Summary Statistics
This table shows the summary statistics. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the full sample. Panel B
reports the t-test results between the two groups before and after the political promotion events. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels respectively. Definition of variables are specified in the Appendix.
Panel A
N

Mean

standard deviation 25th percentile

median

75th percentile

MF_HOLD

45,805

9.8403

13.7852

0.4611

3.4562

13.7663

ΔMF_HOLD

39,412

-0.4796

10.6356

-3.7478

-0.0426

2.4265

MB

45,805

1.7689

1.5201

0.7451

1.3170

2.2291

LEV

45,805

0.4706

0.2030

0.3207

0.4849

0.6253

SIZE

45,805

21.9095

1.1886

21.0451

21.7446

22.5973

ROA

45,805

0.0535

0.0655

0.0173

0.0464

0.0846

CR

45,805

2.1051

2.4489

0.9643

1.3588

2.1421

AR

45,805

0.0991

0.0939

0.0245

0.0738

0.1467

INV

45,805

0.1718

0.1521

0.0694

0.1350

0.2214

GDP

45,805

7.3813

0.8421

6.8638

7.4492

8.0386

SOE

45,805

0.5631

0.4960

0.0000

1.0000

1.0000

STATESHARE

45,805

15.9111

22.8181

0.0000

0.0000

32.8399
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Table 1(continued）
Panel B
Mean
Before

After

Difference

p-value

Treat

Control

MF_HOLD

10.2897

10.4231

-0.133

-0.609

ΔMF_HOLD

0.2005

0.2649

-0.0644

-0.775

MB

1.7295

1.6746

0.0548*

-0.042

LEV

0.4770

0.4900

-0.0130***

0

SIZE

21.7919

21.7717

0.0201

-0.325

ROA

0.0542

0.0520

0.00221

-0.067

CR

2.0467

1.7294

0.317***

0

AR

0.1036

0.1009

0.00263

-0.121

INV

0.1716

0.1712

0.00044

-0.868

GDP

7.2840

6.9898

0.294***

0

SOE

0.5783

0.6444

-0.0661***

0

STATESHARE

20.0238

24.6503

-4.893***

0

N

3,642

8,832

MF_HOLD

9.4817

9.5994

-0.118

-0.49

ΔMF_HOLD

-1.0261

-0.7326

-0.293*

-0.034

MB

1.8482

1.7930

0.0552**

-0.004

LEV

0.448

0.4676

-0.0178***

0

SIZE

21.9959

21.9680

0.0279

-0.07

ROA

0.0539

0.0539

-0.0000372

-0.964

CR

2.4167

2.1832

0.233***

0

AR

0.1026

0.0960

0.00660***

0

INV

0.1700

0.1727

-0.00274

-0.163

GDP

7.7454

7.4545

0.291***

0

SOE

0.4782

0.5525

-0.0743***

0

STATESHARE

9.6756

13.2069

-3.531***

0

N

7,618

19,320
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Table 2
Effects of political promotion on change of institutional ownership
This table shows the regression results of political promotion events on the annual change of
institutional holding.

Robust p-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance

at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Definition of variables are specified in the Appendix.
Dependent variable: ΔMF_HOLD
TREAT
PRE
TREAT × PRE

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.164

-0.152

-0.454*

(0.192)

(0.134)

(0.0884)

-0.259***

-0.265***

(0.000292)

(0.000161)

0.900***

0.916***

(0.000576)

(0.000315)

PRE2

-0.227*
(0.0961)

PRE1

-0.432***
(0.000139)

POST0

-0.163
(0.137)

POST1

-0.0412
(0.600)

TREAT × PRE2

0.784
(0.102)

TREAT × PRE1

1.585***
(0.000245)

TREAT × POST0

0.707*
(0.0974)

TREAT × POST1

0.245
(0.429)

ΔMB
ΔLEV
ΔSIZE
ΔROA

2.739***

2.778***

2.779***

(0)

(0)

(0)

2.069

1.303

1.312

(0.241)

(0.499)

(0.496)

5.025***

5.512***

5.509***

(1.63e-08)

(3.14e-07)

(3.18e-07)

13.78***

12.30***

12.29***

(2.38e-06)

(4.29e-05)

(4.30e-05)
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Table 2(continued）
ΔCR

-0.00348

0.0305

0.0295

(0.970)

(0.818)

(0.824)

-7.339***

-7.393**

-7.343**

(0.00925)

(0.0174)

(0.0185)

-1.895

-1.568

-1.589

(0.292)

(0.442)

(0.436)

1.129***

0.900**

0.910**

(0.000389)

(0.0115)

(0.0106)

0.0812***

0.0844***

0.0846***

(4.64e-10)

(2.66e-09)

(2.52e-09)

-8.177***

-7.113***

-7.005***

(1.31e-05)

(0.000681)

(0.000792)

Observations

39,412

39,412

39,412

R-squared

0.134

0.193

0.193

2003-2014

2003-2014

2003-2014

cluster se

province

province

province

Year FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

ΔAR
ΔINV
ΔGDP
ΔSTATESHARE
Constant

sample period

Firm FE
Province FE

Yes
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Table 3
Effects of political promotion on level of institutional ownership
This table shows the regression results of political promotion events on the levels of institutional
holding.

Robust p-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%,

5%, 1% levels respectively. Definition of variables are specified in the Appendix.
Dependent variable: MF_HOLD
TREAT
PRE2
PRE1
POST0
POST1
TREAT × PRE2
TREAT × PRE1
TREAT × POST0
TREAT × POST1

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.991

-1.220*

0.0265

(0.139)

(0.0863)

(0.922)

1.341**

2.221***

0.0229

(0.0189)

(2.92e-08)

(0.846)

0.928**

1.823***

-0.317**

(0.0165)

(2.40e-08)

(0.0298)

0.559**

1.442***

-0.259*

(0.0200)

(4.85e-08)

(0.0649)

0.380***

0.458***

-0.168**

(0.00889)

(0.00783)

(0.0462)

0.352

0.445

-0.429

(0.757)

(0.480)

(0.239)

1.284

1.281**

0.834**

(0.118)

(0.0359)

(0.0391)

1.804***

1.444*

0.761*

(0.00906)

(0.0614)

(0.0662)

0.989**

1.914***

0.583**

(0.0194)

(0.00172)

(0.0392)

2.942***

3.411***

(0)

(0)

9.882***

8.583***

(1.56e-07)

(2.65e-07)

2.557***

3.304***

(0)

(0)

71.09***

61.79***

(0)

(0)

0.150

0.221**

(0.117)

(0.0190)

MB
LEV
SIZE
ROA
CR
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Table 3(continued）
AR

7.747***

8.550***

(0.00109)

(0.000291)

-1.244

-1.309

(0.181)

(0.119)

-0.706

-1.407***

(0.186)

(0.00257)

-0.564

-1.240

(0.152)

(0.553)

9.305***

-57.16***

-69.82***

(0)

(0)

(2.07e-06)

Observations

45,805

45,805

45,805

R-squared

0.002

0.276

0.333

2003-2014

2003-2014

2003-2014

province

province

province

INV
SOE
GDP
Constant

sample period
cluster se
Year FE

Yes

Province FE

Yes
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Table 4
Stock market reaction to political promotion
This table shows the regression results of political promotion events on cumulative market returns.
Robust p-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels respectively. Definition of variables are specified in the Appendix.
Dependent variables
RET

CAR

(1)

(2)

0.239***

-0.0158

(0.00747)

(0.609)

0.462***

0.128***

(0)

(0)

0.886***

0.318***

(0)

(0)

1.354***

0.553***

(0)

(0)

0.100

0.0526**

(0.159)

(0.0363)

0.167**

0.0810**

(0.0385)

(0.0291)

0.148**

0.0703*

(0.0166)

(0.0911)

0.0148

0.0257

(0.580)

(0.256)

479,904

479,904

0.362

0.280

2003-2014

2003-2014

cluster se

province

province

Firm FE

Yes

Yes

Year FE

Yes

Yes

TREAT
POST0
POST1
POST2
TREAT × POST0
TREAT × POST1
TREAT × POST2
Constant

Observations
R-squared
sample period
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Table 5
Effects of political promotion on change of institutional ownership given different stateown share percentage
This table shows the regression results of political promotion events on annual changes of
institutional ownership in two subsamples with different state-own share percentage. A firm is
classifiedas high state-own share percentage if the central of local government holds more than
20% of the total shares in issue. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Definition of variables are specified in
the Appendix.
Dependent variable: ΔMF_HOLD
TREAT
PRE2
PRE1
POST0
POST1
TREAT × PRE2
TREAT × PRE1
TREAT × POST0
TREAT × POST1
ΔMB
ΔLEV
ΔSIZE
ΔROA

(1)

(2)

-0.434

-0.0571

(0.128)

(0.920)

-0.121

-0.140

(0.494)

(0.483)

-0.524***

-0.0932

(0.000706)

(0.396)

-0.0779

-0.0848

(0.519)

(0.634)

0.00818

-0.0658

(0.926)

(0.715)

0.457

0.495

(0.448)

(0.564)

1.827***

0.344

(0.000294)

(0.506)

0.422

0.381

(0.348)

(0.638)

0.0733

0.282

(0.830)

(0.725)

2.424***

3.486***

(6.04e-11)

(8.76e-08)

0.383

1.285

(0.865)

(0.814)

4.936***

7.107***

(1.04e-07)

(0.000390)

5.400*

27.51***

(0.0648)

(0.000685)
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Table 5(continued）
ΔCR

0.0370

0.138

(0.842)

(0.642)

-5.466*

-11.68

(0.0841)

(0.115)

-3.482

-1.437

(0.122)

(0.806)

0.852**

0.0400

(0.0425)

(0.952)

-6.366***

-1.761

(0.00751)

(0.591)

Observations

26,755

12,657

R-squared

0.235

0.264

2003-2014

2003-2014

cluster se

province

province

Firm FE

Yes

Yes

Year FE

Yes

Yes

State-own share percentage

low

high

ΔAR
ΔINV
ΔGDP
Constant

sample period
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